This chapter provides an empirical analysis of interactions between FDI flows and domestic investment in capacity. As a motivation for the empirical analysis, I provide highlights of a new theory of FDI. The theory captures unique feature: hands-on management standards, that enable investors to react in real time to on-going changes in the economic environment, which surrounds investors. Equipped with superior managerial skills, foreign direct investors are able to outbid portfolio investors for the top productivity firms in a domestic specialized industry, in which they have some comparative advantage in the source country.
capacity helps explain the volume of FDI inflows, more significantly than it helps explain either foreign portfolio inflows or foreign debt inflows.
Introduction
The term "Foreign Direct Investment" usually brings to mind a significant contribution of FDI to domestic investment and to capital inflows. However, there have been a lot of scepticisms concerning the contribution of FDI to these engines of growth. As noted by Froot (1993) , FDI (the purchase by a domestic resident of a controlling stake in a foreign company) actually requires neither capital flows nor investment in capacity. Conceptually, FDI is an extension of corporate control over international boundaries: "When Japaneseowned Bridgestone takes control over the US firm Firestone, capital need not flow into the US. US domestic lenders can largely finance the equity purchase. Any borrowing by
Bridgestone from foreign-based third parties also does not qualify as FDI (although it would count as an inflow of portfolio capital into the US). And, of course, in such acquisition there is no investment expenditure; merely an international transfer in the title of corporate assets." Does this example capture the essence of FDI in emerging economies?
The answer we provide in this paper, based on a new theory, and new empirical evidence, is that FDI flows does play an important role in the skimming of high productivity investment projects and thereby contributes significantly to domestic investment in both the quantity and the quality dimensions.
Old and New Theories
Theories of FDI can essentially be divided into two categories: micro (industrial organization) theories and macro-finance (cost of capital) theories. The early literature that explains FDI in microeconomic terms focuses on market imperfections, and on the desire of multinational enterprises to expand their market power (see Caves (1971) ). Subsequent literature cantered more on firm-specific advantages, owing to product superiority or cost advantages, stemming from economies of scale, multi-plants economies and advanced technology, or superior marketing and distribution (see Helpman (1984) ). According to this view, multinationals find it cheaper to expand directly in a foreign country, rather than through trade, in cases where the advantages associated with cost or product are based on internal, indivisible assets based on knowledge and technology. Alternative explanations for FDI have focused on regulatory restrictions, including tariffs, quotas, that either encourage or discourage cross-border acquisitions, depending on whether one considers horizontal or vertical integrations.
Studies examining the macroeconomic effects of exchange rate on FDI focussed on the positive effects of an exchange rate depreciation of the host country on FDI inflows, because it lowers the cost of production and investment in the host countries, raising the profitability of foreign direct investment. The wealth effect is another channel through which a depreciation of the real exchange rate could raise FDI. A depreciation of the real exchange rate, by raising the relative wealth of foreign firms, could make it easier for those firms to use retained profits to finance investment abroad and to post a collateral in borrowing from domestic lenders in the host country capital market (see Froot (1991) and Razin and Sadka (2001) What is the essential difference between portfolio investment and FDI investment from the point of view of corporate governance?
Management under portfolio equity ownership may be plagued by a free-rider problem.
Under disperse ownership, if an individual shareholder does something to improve the quality of management, the benefits will accrue also to all other shareholders, see Oliver
Hart. In contrast, FDI investor, who is endowed with management skills and gains control of the firm, has better incentives to pursue proper monitoring of management, and will be in better position to micro manage the firm. Furthermore, based on possessing "intangible capital" in her source country, the FDI investor can apply more efficient management standards in the host country compared to domestic investors. Thus, the unique advantage to FDI, that has only recently been explored, is the potential for superior micromanagement, based on the specialization in niches of industry. Important issues with FDI from this standpoint are: (1) what are the salient characteristics of the free-FDI-flows equilibrium, when FDI investors take control over domestic firms. (2) What constitute the gains from FDI flows to the host economy, given that the foreign investors appropriate the private rewards resulting from their superior management skills; and (3) Whether or not the free-FDI-flows regime is more efficient than free-portfolio-flows regime.
In an integrated capital market, with full information, all forms of capital flows (FDI, loans, and Portfolio equity and debt) are indistinguishable. In the presence of incomplete information, these flows are significantly different from one another. In Razin and Sadka (2002), we developed a stylised model of FDI in the presence of imperfect information with respect to the firm's productivity.
We formalized the unique advantage of FDI investment over other types of investment in a stylised model. Suppose that initially all firms are still owned by original (domestic) uninformed owners, and suppose that the productivity shock is purely idiosyncratic. At the beginning of the first period, when investment decisions are made, firms are still uninformed about the productivity shock (the productivity level of the specific firm which they own). It will be revealed only in the second period, when output from new capital becomes public knowledge. In order to make new investment the firm must incur first a fixed set-up cost. As the firms are all ex-ante identical, if they have to make the investment decision based on this level of information, they will all invest the same, in accordance with the expected level of the productivity factor. Assume now that at this stage, before the productivity factor is known, foreign direct investors step in. Once acquiring and effectively managing the firm, the FDI investor can better monitor the productivity of the firm than her domestic investor counterpart. She can thus fine-tune the level of capital stock more closely to the value of the productivity factor. Anticipating this fine-tuned investment schedule, the value of the firm to the potential FDI investor is larger than the reservation value to the original owner, and the corresponding bid value to potential domestic investors. Therefore, FDI investors will outbid domestic investors for the firms in the domestic industry. Competition among potential FDI investors will drive up the price close to the price, which reflect the upgraded management of the firm. The initial domestic owners will gain the rent, which is equal to difference between the FDI investor's shadow price and the initial owner's reservation price.
If the competition between potential FDI investors is perfect, all the benefits from the superior FDI management skills accrue to the host economy, leaving the FDI investors with a return on their investment just equalling the world rate of interest. The gains to the host economy from FDI inflows can on this case be classified into two categories. 
The Evidence
Like its theoretical counterpart, empirical work has tended to focus either on underlying factors to explain the location of FDI flows across countries or on explaining the cyclical behaviour of FDI flows using macroeconomic variables, and assessing the contribution of An additional (striking) feature of FDI flows that was noted in previous literature is that the share of FDI in total inflows is higher in riskier countries, as measured either by countries' credit ratings for sovereign (government) debt or other indicators of country risk (see Figure 2 ). There is also some evidence that the FDI share is higher in countries where the quality of corporate governance institutions is lower. What can explain these seemingly paradoxical findings? One explanation is that FDI is more likely, compared with other forms of capital flows, to take place in countries with missing or inefficient markets. In such settings, foreign investors will prefer to operate directly instead of relying on local financial markets, suppliers, or legal arrangements. The system of equations is given by: Tables 3-6 present the estimation results, and we discuss them equation-by-equation.
Domestic Investment: Findings
We start with Table 3 , which describes the effects of capital inflows on domestic investment.
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The coefficient of FDI is significant in the OLS and TSLS regressions. FDI long-run effect on domestic investment is 0.94 in the OLS regression and 0.68 in the TSLS regression.
Thus, potential for an upward bias in the OLS estimation procedure appears to be validated. The long-term effect expresses the lagged timed structure of the 2SLS estimation. It is calculated as the sum of a converging geometric series: β xi / ( 1-β x(-1)I ) Table 4 describes the effect of domestic investment on FDI inflows, allowing for the effects of a group of other traditional variables, such as growth, and capital controls.
The coefficient of domestic investment is positive and significant in both the OLS and the TSLS regression. The long-run effect is in the OLS (0.08) is smaller than in the TSLS (0.14). Loan Inflows Table 5 describes the effect of domestic investment on loans inflows, allowing for the effect of growth. The coefficient of domestic investment is negative and non-significant in the OLS but positive and significant in the TSLS regression. The long run effect moves up from -0.03 in the OLS regression to 0.08 in the TSLS regression. 
The Contribution of Capital Inflows to Output Growth: Findings
This section we estimate the contribution of FDI, loans and portfolio investment to output growths. Similarly to the empirical framework in section 3.3.1, the system of equations is given by: FDI Inflows Table 9 describes the effect of output growth on FDI inflows, allowing for the effects of a group of other control variables, such as domestic investment, and capital controls.
The coefficient of output growth is positive and significant in the TSLS regression. The longrun effect is 0.05. Loan Inflows Table 10 describes the effect of output growth on loans inflows, allowing for the effect of domestic investment. The coefficient of output growth is non-significant in the both regressions. 
Summary
We now summarize the main findings of the panel-data analysis concerning interactions between capital inflows and investment in capacity (or growth):
(1) FDI flows have a larger (independent) effect on domestic investment in capacity (or growth) than loan inflows or foreign-portfolio inflows.
(2) Domestic investment in capacity (or output growth) has more pronounced effects on FDI inflows, than on either loan inflows or foreign-portfolio inflows.
Conclusion
Kindleberger (1969) suggests that in order to think about FDI we must ask not why capital might flow into a country, but rather why some particular asset would be worth more under foreign than under domestic control. In this chapter I discuss empirical implications of a new of FDI, which captures a unique feature: hands-on management standards that enable investors to react in real time to changing economic environment surrounding the investors.
Equipped with superior managerial skills, foreign direct investors are able to outbid portfolio investors for the top productivity firms in a particular industry in which they have specialized in the source country. Consequently, FDI investors would make investment, both larger, and higher quality, than the domestic investors. The theory can explain both two-way FDI flows among developed countries, and one-way FDI flows from developed to developing countries.
Gains to the host country from FDI stem from the informational value of FDI.
Main predictions of the theory are consistent with evidence from panel data: larger FDI coefficients in the domestic-investment and output-growth regressions relative to the portfolio equity and international loans inflow coefficients, reflects a unique role for FDI in the domestic investment and growth process.
Does this mean that the chapter brings out a case for subsidizing either domestic investment in capacity (because it brings in more FDI) or foreign direct investment (because it helps domestic investment in capacity and growth)?
A cautionary word based on the Irish case is in order. One can argue, convincingly, that the heavy subsidization of FDI inflows in Ireland in the past two decades resulted in impressive GDP growth rates, but with less pronounced effect on the well being of Irish residents, as crudely measured by the Irish GNP growth rates. Thus, gains to the host country are not fully captured by the increase in domestic investment in capacity, to which FDI inflows give rise.
Capital control data was taken from IMF publications.
A few missing data items regarding loans for Israel were taken from the bank of Israel resources. 
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